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“It’s the Same Old Song”: The Failure
of the Originality Requirement in
Musical Copyright
Valeria M. Castanaro*
Have you ever flipped through the radio stations and felt like
you’re hearing the same song over and over again? Better yet,
have you ever paused on one station thinking that one song was
playing, but in fact a different song was being broadcast that
sounded dubiously similar to the song you initially perceived?
Billie Holiday once said: “If you copy, it means you’re working
without any real feeling. No two people on Earth are alike, and it’s
got to be that way in music or it isn’t music.”1 If Billie Holiday
was listening to the radio today, she wouldn’t know what to call
the sound waves taking over the airwaves because to her, the
barrage of copycat artists and dubiously similar songs simply
would not be music. As a teenager, I was constantly subjected to
my mother’s opinion that all of the music I listened to either
sounded the same or was a rip-off of a song from her generation.
As an adult reflecting on the music of my generation, I’m inclined
to agree with her and have begun to wonder where the originality
in music has gone—and how can we get it back?2

A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2820. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.
1
Billie Holiday, BrainyQuote, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/b/billie_
holiday.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
2
Alex Tyson, Musicians Lose Artistic Integrity, UNIVERSITY WIRE, May 26, 2006
(commenting on the lack of the originality in “new” music and hypothesizing as to why
the art of copying music sells records).

1271

CASTANARO_050508_FINAL

1272

5/5/2008 12:32:36 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 18

Apparently, this is not an original question. In light of the
recent copyright scandal centered on Avril Lavigne’s 2007 summer
hit, Girlfriend, many voices in popular culture have begun to
question the originality requirement of musical works.3 A 1970s
musical group, The Rubinoos, brought suit for copyright
infringement against Ms. Lavigne on May 25, 2007, claiming that
her hit, Girlfriend, is an infringement upon their 1979 song, I
Wanna Be Your Boyfriend.4 Since the start of this controversy, it
has also been said that Girlfriend sounds dubiously similar to Tony
Basil’s Mickey.5 One newspaper writer, commenting on the
frequency of the practice of copyright infringement in the musical
world, said: “Granted, I’m no lawyer. But if I were Avril, I might
go with the ‘everyone else is doing it’ defense.”6
The existence of two songs sounding remarkably similar is not
a new occurrence. We live in a musical era marked by covers,
music sampling, and dubiously similar songs that are the product
of both accidental and conscious borrowing.7 When The Rubinoos
released I Wanna Be Your Boyfriend, it was widely recognized
among record reviewers and fans alike that the chorus melody bore
a remarkable resemblance to that of the Rolling Stones’ song Get
Off Of My Cloud.8 Other examples of songs that are suspiciously
similar to those that came before them include Vanilla Ice’s Ice Ice
Baby (compared with David Bowie and Queen’s Under Pressure),9
2 Live Crew’s Pretty Woman (compared with Roy Orbison’s song
by the same name),10 the Red Hot Chili Peppers’ Dani California

3

See infra Part III.
Girlfriend (Avril Lavigne Song), Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Girlfriend_
(Avril_Lavigne_song) (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
5
Ernest Jasmin, Hey, Your Influences are Showing, THE NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma,
Wash.), July 20, 2007.
6
Id.
7
Id. (“[O]bviously a lot of today’s songs sound dubiously like yesterday’s songs.”).
8
Ann Powers, Critic’s Notebook: Originality? Since When was that a Requirement?,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2007, at F01.
9
See Brian G. Bourke, Ice Hot? Robert Van Winkle: Is He a For Real Act or Has He
Got Us All Snowed?, THE POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, NY), Mar. 7, 1991, at HJ.
10
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1993).
4
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(compared with Tom Petty’s Mary Jane’s Last Dance),11 and
Michael Bolton’s Love is a Wonderful Thing (compared with the
Isley Brothers song by the same name).12 I’m sure you can think
of a plethora of songs that fit into this category. So the question
remains: how can creativity and originality in the music industry
work together with accountability to simultaneously protect the
rights of original copyright holders and prevent stifling the creative
process?
Angry pop-rock princess Avril is not the first of her peers to be
the subject of copyright infringement allegations. These suits,
brought by original artists against new artists who produce songs
that sound remarkably like the original, are usually, but not always,
settled out of court. In the case of the above mentioned Michael
Bolton song, the original artists, the Isley Brothers, were awarded
$5.4 million in damages in 1994.13 Similarly, Vanilla Ice was
forced to share the royalties from Ice Ice Baby with David Bowie
and Queen, the original artists of Under Pressure, for use of a
seemingly similar bass line.14 Further terms of the settlement also
required that Vanilla Ice retroactively give David Bowie and the
members of Queen songwriting credit.15 George Harrison was not
fortunate enough to settle his suit with the Chiffons out of court.
In Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., the district
court found Harrison guilty of subconscious copyright
infringement,16 and he consequently paid damages in excess of
$500,000.17

11

See David Schmeichel, Rename that Tune?; Creedence Clearwater Revival’s John
Fogerty is Not the Only Rocker Who’s Been Accused of Rewriting History, WINNIPEG
SUN, July 26, 2007, at 38.
12
How They Measure Up, LONDON FREE PRESS (Ontario), July 15, 2007, at E12.
13
Id.
14
Bourke, supra note 9.
15
See Ice Ice Baby, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ice_Ice_Baby (last visited
Mar. 9, 2008); see, e.g., Ice Ice Baby, BMI Repertoire, http://repertoire.bmi.com (search
for title “Ice Ice Baby”) (listing David Bowie, the members of Queen, and Robert Van
Winkle (“Vanilla Ice”) as songwriters).
16
See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that copyright infringement exists under the law even if it is
accomplished subconsciously).
17
See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 798, 801 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
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In light of these examples of similar songs, settlements, and
actual litigation, it is clear that actual originality in music is on its
way out, and technological advancements and the Internet seem to
be the reason why. In response to the Internet’s effect on pop
music, Elton John “suggested that a five-year cyberspace shutdown
might be the only way to renew the music’s creativity.”18
Although it is true that the history of making music is deeply
embedded in borrowing and sampling,19 artists still like to think of
their expression as original and unique.20 Unfortunately, the public
does not think a musical work that sounds dubiously similar to a
previous work is original or unique, despite the artist’s intention.
The listening public deserves more in the way of creativity.21
This Note examines traditional copyright infringement, such as
the alleged borrowing that is the subject of controversy in the Avril
Lavigne situation, in light of new and advanced technology and
media. Part I provides a legal background of copyright, detailing
the purpose and rationale of the Copyright Act, the rights of a
copyright holder, the interpretation of the originality requirement,
and the elements of copyright infringement. Part II presents the
conflict resulting from the inability of the current musical
copyright regime to address the epidemic of traditional copyright
infringement made easier by the Internet. Part III proposes that
one way to address the inadequacy of the current musical copyright
schema is to raise the bar for the originality requirement in musical
copyright and to use the new level of access provided by the
Internet to increase artists’ awareness of, and accountability to, the
existing catalogue.

18

Powers, supra note 8.
Jasmin, supra note 5 (discussing the history of musical borrowing).
20
Powers, supra note 8 (“Artists like to believe their self-expression is really theirs;
perhaps even more importantly, the financial structure of the music industry, which
rewards creativity when it’s copyrighted, has upheld the idea that one person can ‘own’ a
song.”).
21
See id. (“To music fans who still believe that heroic individualism is the essence of
great music . . . they are the ones pop is leaving behind. Originality is dead. Long may
creativity flower as it rises from the earth of a million songs . . . that have come before.”).
19

CASTANARO_050508_FINAL

2008]

5/5/2008 12:32:36 PM

ORIGINALITY IN MUSICAL COPYRIGHT

1275

I. COPYRIGHT LAW
A major public policy concern has always been balancing the
interests of promoting creativity in the arts and protecting the
creator of the artistic expression.22 Congress passed the Copyright
Act of 1976, codified in Title 17 of the United States Code, as an
extension of its power as provided for in the United States
Constitution.23 Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution
states the following: “[t]he Congress shall have the power to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries.”24 Congress exercised this
power through different versions of the Act, the most recent being
the Copyright Act of 1976.25 The goal of the Copyright Act is to
protect original works of authorship, while still promoting the
creation of new works.26 Copyright law promotes creativity by
protecting original works from being copied in their use and
enjoyment by the general public. This simultaneously creates
incentives for authors by ensuring that credit is given where credit
is due. At the same time, the protection of these works cannot be
to such an extent as to stifle the creation of new works by new
artists.27
Works that are entitled to copyright protection are defined in §
102 of the Copyright Act.28 According to the statute, “musical
works, including any accompanying words,” as well as “sound
22

See History of Copyright Law, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_
copyright_law (last visited Mar. 9, 2008).
23
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25
The Copyright Act of 1976 is the governing body of law for determining whether or
not a work is entitled to copyright protection, and if so, what constitutes infringement of
the copyrighted work. See Randy S. Kravis, Does a Song by any Other Name Still Sound
as Sweet?: Digital Sampling and its Copyright Implications, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 231, 239–
40 (1993).
26
See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647, 656 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“The copyright laws attempt to strike a balance between protecting original works and
stifling further creativity.”).
27
See, e.g., Meade v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 367, 371–72 (1992) (quoting Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429–30 (1984) (describing
how Congress must balance the protection of work with the free flow of ideas)).
28
17 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(2), (7).
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recordings,” are copyrightable expressions.29 The artist who holds
the copyright to an original work is entitled to exclusive rights in
the work as provided in § 106 of the Act.30 Section 106 provides
the author of a musical work with the exclusive rights to reproduce
or sell the copyrighted work, prepare derivative works, perform or
display the work, and to perform the work publicly through the use
of digital audio transmission.31 Copyright infringement occurs
when someone interferes with any of the exclusive rights of a
copyright holder.32 To avoid infringement, the individual seeking
to use the copyrighted work must seek the permission of the
copyright holder.33 The exclusive rights of § 106 are subject to
limitations, such as the fair use exception34 and certain
performances, as provided in §§ 107 through 122.35
A central component of copyright law is the doctrine of the
idea-expression dichotomy.
The idea-expression dichotomy
acknowledges that there are two components to any copyrighted
work: the ideas behind the work and the actual expression of those
ideas that becomes the work. It is a generally accepted principle of
copyright law that copyright protection does not extend to “any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery.”36 In determining what aspects of a work
are entitled to copyright protection, the court must separate the
elements of original expression in a work from the basic ideas
embodied in the work.37 Only the elements comprising original
29

Id.
See id. § 106.
31
See id. A derivative work is a musical work that includes significant portions of
copyrighted material of an original, previously created work. See id. § 101.
32
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 796 (8th ed. 2004).
33
See Joseph K. Christian, Too Much of a Good Thing? Deciphering Copyright
Infringement for the Musician, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 132, 133 (2004) (interpreting
the meaning of the exclusive rights in a copyrighted work to a copyright holder in music).
34
Fair use entitles others to use a copyrighted work for certain purposes, such as
educational use. The court examines four factors when deciding whether or not a
potential infringement constitutes fair use: (1) purpose and character of the use; (2) nature
of the copyrighted work; (3) amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the work as a whole; and (4) effect of the use on the potential market or value of the
copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
35
See id. § 106; see also id. §§ 107–22.
36
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
37
See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 836 (10th Cir. 1993).
30
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expression receive copyright protection.38 The concept behind the
idea-expression dichotomy is related to the basic maxim of
copyright law, which seeks to balance rewarding the author and
allowing for the creation of new works.39 Therefore, the exclusive
rights of the copyright holder only extend to the protected
elements.
Another fundamental aspect of copyright is that copyright
protection may only be afforded to “original works of
authorship.”40 Throughout the history of copyright law, courts
have declined to define the meaning of originality in this context.41
The legislative history of § 102 explains that the phrase “original
works of authorship” was purposely left undefined in order to
allow the courts to develop the concept.42 Originality is not meant
to include “requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit.”43
Only a minimal amount of originality is required for a work to
qualify for protection.44 The work simply needs to be original to
the author and include a modicum of creative thought.45 In the
context of musical works, originality needs to be found in the
song’s rhythm, harmony, or melody.46 Originality is most often
found in melody, however, a “musical theme” that is suggestive of
a previous work may still be considered original if the “overall
impression is of a new work.”47 Despite this low threshold, the
38

See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647, 656 (6th Cir. 2004).
40
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
41
See 1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01
(2007) (noting that there is no definition of originality in the statute and that the 1909 Act
did not define or explicitly require originality) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
42
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/
uscode/html/uscode17/usc_sec_17_00000102----000-notes.html.
43
Id.
44
ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 377 (4th ed. 2006) (citing Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102–03 (2d Cir. 1951)); see also Emanation Inc. v.
Zomba Recording Inc., 72 F.App’x 187, 190 (5th Cir. 2003).
45
MERGES ET AL., supra note 44, at 377 (“As developed by the courts, originality
entails independent creation of a work featuring a modicum of creativity. Independent
creation requires only that the author not have copied the work from some other
source.”).
46
See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 41, § 2.05(D).
47
Id.
39

CASTANARO_050508_FINAL

1278

5/5/2008 12:32:36 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 18

court has acknowledged that originality is an indispensable part of
copyright.48
Violation of the exclusive rights to an original work of
authorship constitutes copyright infringement, and § 501 of the
Copyright Act governs infringing activity.49 To prevail on a claim
of infringement, the party asserting infringement must possess a
valid copyright in the original work and must show that the
defendant copied protected elements of the original work.50
Ownership of a valid copyright is easily proven through a
certification of copyright, which is issued to the holder by the
Copyright Office.51 After establishing ownership in a valid
copyright, the holder must show that the accused infringed upon
the holder’s exclusive rights, either through direct or indirect
evidence of copying.52 If a presumption of infringement is shown,
the defendant bears the burden of overcoming the presumption.53
The difficult element of copyright litigation lies within proving
that the defendant actually copied the original work. To prove that
actual copying has occurred, the copyright holder must show
through direct or indirect evidence that the defendant had access to
the copyrighted work and that there are probative similarities
between the two works.54 Direct copying occurs when the new
work borrows verbatim from the original.55 Factual copying is
shown through evidence that the defendant had access to the
original work before creating the infringing work, and probative
similarities between the works.56 In situations where the original
and infringed work are “so strikingly similar” that the similarities

48

See Feist Publ’ns. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (stating that although
minimal, the requirement of originality is a necessary aspect of a copyrightable work).
49
See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000).
50
See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 831 (10th Cir.
1993).
51
See id.
52
See id. at 832.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 832–33.
55
Emanation Inc. v. Zomba Recording Inc., 72 F.App’x. 187, 189 (5th Cir. 2003).
56
Id.
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cannot reasonably be attributed to coincidence, the court can draw
an inference of copying without evidence of access.57
Proving that the defendant had access to the original work is an
issue in and of itself. Black’s Law Dictionary defines access in the
copyright context as: “an opportunity by one accused of
infringement to see, hear, or copy a copyrighted work before the
alleged infringement took place.”58 Courts generally require a
showing of access in order to establish a prima facie case of
infringement.59 In determining whether or not access exists, the
court looks to whether or not the alleged infringer “had a
reasonable opportunity to view the copyrighted work.”60 A
plaintiff can meet the burden of showing reasonable opportunity by
producing evidence that the original work had been widely
disseminated, or that the defendant had been exposed to the work
through a chain of events.61
The issue of access can be overcome by showing that the
similarities between the original and infringing work are
substantial to the point that exceeds coincidence.62 There have
been cases where the proof of access was weak but the court found
the similarities warranted a finding of infringement.63 There have
also been cases where the court found that, despite lack of
evidence of access, the defendant was guilty of infringement
because the songs were so similar that they would be identical to
the ear of the “ordinary listener.”64 Finally, there have been
situations where the court has held the defendant guilty of
subconscious infringement. In the aforementioned case, the court

57

See Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978).
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 14 (8th ed. 2004).
59
See AM. JUR. 2d, Copyright and Literary Property § 206 (1985); Arnstein v. Porter,
154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
60
Kravis, supra note 25, at 245.
61
See Lassin v. Island Def Jam Music Group, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43862, at *15–16
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2005).
62
See generally Aaron Keyt, An Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism Litigation,
76 CAL. L. REV. 429 (1988) (discussing the changing concept of access in light of
unconscious copyright infringement).
63
See id. at 429.
64
See Dorchester Music Corp. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 171 F. Supp. 580, 586–87 (S.D.
Cal. 1959).
58
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concluded that George Harrison had infringed upon the Chiffon’s
copyrighted material without even realizing he had done so.65
The test courts use in examining the similarities between two
works does not necessarily examine the quantitative amount of the
original work that has been copied. Rather, the court finds that
there is a compelling interest in the significance of the copied
portion to the original work as a whole.66 A new work fails the
substantial similarity test when a reasonable listener fails to see or
hear how the new work incorporated something that does not exist
in the original.67 In order to constitute substantial similarity, “the
‘total concept’ and ‘feel’ of the two works must be similar.”68 In
line with the substantial similarity test, courts have also adopted
the de minimis doctrine, which applies in cases where the aspect of
the work that is the subject of the alleged infringement is so
miniscule that the law will not consider it.69
II. “WHY’D YA HAVE TO GO AND MAKE THINGS SO
COMPLICATED?”:70 THE CLASH BETWEEN THE
INTERNET AND MUSICAL COPYRIGHT
A. Music as a Distinctive Genre of Copyright
Music is a unique genre in the field of copyright protection. It
is a special category deserving of independent copyright
consideration. “The inherent nature of music makes it difficult to
detect copyright violations.”71 Each musical composition and
sound recording is composed of multiple elements working
together. New technology and the digital world have created new
and improved means for manipulating those elements in an
65
Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that copyright infringement exists under the law even if it is
accomplished subconsciously).
66
See Courtney Bartlett, Bridgeport Music’s Two-Second Sample Rule Puts the Chill
on the Music Industry, 15 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 301, 311 (2005).
67
See Kravis, supra note 25, at 245–46.
68
Id.
69
See Bartlett, supra note 66, at 312.
70
AVRIL LAVIGNE, Complicated, on LET GO (Arista Records 2002).
71
Christian, supra note 33, at 133.
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original work and incorporating them into a new work.72 The
traditional lens for examining musical copyright is outdated
because it fails to consider the complexity of a contemporary
musical work.73
In some situations, it is difficult to reconcile a finding of actual
infringement in light of the inevitable similarities that exist among
musical works.74 Musicians work with a finite set of notes and
octaves in creating a composition. Further, the combination of
these notes into sets of chords that are pleasing to the ear is also
limited.75 Despite the seemingly confined raw materials for
creating a musical work, musicians are able to manipulate these
finite elements into infinite possible compositions. In examining
originality, copyright does not look to the actual notes or chords
used, but rather combinations of notes and chords that are used to
create tone, melody, harmony, and rhythm.76
Traditionally, it is believed that originality in a musical work
lies in either the rhythm, melody, or harmony of the piece.77 This
notion of originality fails to account for the multitude of
components that make up a musical work. Consequently, the
frame of reference for musical copyright infringement is outdated
because it fails to consider all of the possible aspects for originality
in a musical work.78 Additional technical elements that should be
examined in determining the originality of a work are “patterns of
notes, using a particular phrase as melody or accompaniment, the
72

See id. at 142.
See Alan Korn, Issues Facing Legal Practitioners in Measuring Substantiality of
Contemporary Musical Expression, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 489, 490–91
(2007).
74
See Christian, supra note 33, at 133 (“These similarities demonstrate the need for a
systematic method of distinguishing the acceptable similarities from the offensive
takings.”).
75
See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647, 653 (6th Cir. 2004)
(stating the fact that there are a limited amount of notes and chords available to
composers).
76
See Ronald Smith, Arrangements and Editions of Public Domain Music: Originality
in a Finite System, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 104, 104 (1983) (“Copyright law seeks to
determine whether a certain combination of tones is ‘original’ within this finite system.”).
77
See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 41 and accompanying text.
78
See Korn, supra note 73, at 490–91 (proposing that the lens for examining musical
copyright is too limited in its consideration of what can make a musical work original).
73
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chord structure of the piece, [and] the lyrics used in specific parts
of the work.”79
Music is also a special genre of copyright with regard to the
idea-expression dichotomy. The idea-expression dichotomy holds
that only elements of original expression, separate from the basic
ideas underlying the expression, are entitled to copyright
protection.80 The elements of musical works are not easily
separated into those constituting original expression and those that
are part of the basic, mechanical ideas.81 An artist’s musical
expression is inextricably linked to the mechanics of the music.
The sequencing of notes and chords, the harmony, melody, beat,
tempo, composition, and lyrics all work together to create a
musical expression.82 Individually, each of these components,
except for the lyrics, constitutes an unoriginal, un-copyrightable
idea. Collectively, certain lyrics set to certain notes and chords,
played in a certain way creates an expression. It’s an expression
that becomes an experience to the person who listens to and
engages with it.83 Removing the individual ideas would destroy
the musical work as a whole. Simply put, “[i]n music, there is no
‘idea’ or ‘expression’ to be distinguished . . . it is an impossible
distinction to make.”84
B. Changing Technology and Copyright
Conflicts concerning copyright infringement, especially those
arising out of musical works, are at the forefront of current
discussions regarding the role of the Internet and advanced
technology and the rights of copyright holders.85 The advent of
new technology and subsequent tension with copyright laws
unequipped to respond is not a novel concern for the courts. When
79

Christian, supra note 33, at 135.
See supra text accompanying notes 36–39.
81
See Keyt, supra note 62, at 421–22 (explaining why music as a medium does not
lend itself to the idea-expression dichotomy).
82
See Smith, supra note 76, at 118.
83
See J. Michael Keyes, Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music Copyright
Protection, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 407, 421, 424 (stating that music has
“ethereal qualities” that affect and impact its listeners’ lives and experiences).
84
Keyt, supra note 62, at 442–43.
85
See Keyes, supra note 83, at 408–09.
80
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Sony introduced the Beta Max, and its capabilities to tape one
television program while the viewer was either not home or
occupied with another program, the court was forced to decide
whether or not these capabilities constituted infringement.86 The
Court held that the Beta Max’s ability to shift time did not
constitute infringement, and order was restored to the land of
copyright litigation.87
More recently, the practice of music sampling has consumed
conversation and litigation regarding musical copyright
infringement. Although music sampling is not a novel practice, it
has become a more prevalent custom in all musical genres.88
Sampling allows one musician to directly lift some part of another
artist’s work and incorporate it into the musician’s new work.89
Courts have been divided on how to handle the issue of sampling
and whether or not it constitutes infringement. This has resulted in
a number of inconsistent decisions that introduced competing
concepts over how much sampling was too much or too little to
constitute infringement.90 The Sixth Circuit in Bridgeport Music,
Inc. v. Dimension Films made a controversial decision91 holding
that all sampling, whether it consisted of three notes or a full
minute of an original work, constitutes infringement.92

86

See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984).
87
See id.
88
See Jeffrey F. Kersting, Singing a Different Tune: Was the Sixth Circuit Justified in
Changing the Protection of Sound Recordings In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension
Films?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 665–67 (2005) (discussing the history of sampling).
89
Sampling (Music), Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sampling_%28music
%29 (last visited Feb. 19, 2008).
90
Different courts have approached the issue of determining what amount of sampling
constitutes infringement in various ways. Compare, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 204 F.
Supp. 2d 1244, 1259 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that a sampled three-note sequence was
too small to constitute infringement), with Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,
401 F.3d 647, 656–68 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that all sampling, even three notes,
constitutes infringement).
91
See generally Bartlett, supra note 66, at 320–21 (criticizing the Bridgeport court);
see also M. Leah Somoano, Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films: Has Unlicensed
Sampling of Copyrighted Sound Recordings Come to an End?, 21 BERKELY TECH. L.J.
289 (2006); Kersting, supra note 88.
92
Bridgeport, 401 F.3d at 656–68.
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At times, Congress has responded to issues facing the court by
passing new legislation that attempts to regulate the Internet and
infringement.93 In the 1990s, it was widely recognized that the
copyright laws were inadequate in light of the changes in
communication and availability of information made possible by
the Internet and digital technology.94 Limited to the provisions of
the Copyright Act of 1976, the copyright laws were outdated and
could not properly accommodate the consequences of such
advancements.95 Copyright holders, especially those holding
rights to musical works, were scrambling to protect their work and
found that they were somewhat powerless against the popularity of
the World Wide Web.96 Legislators and judiciaries were, and still
are, forced to reexamine how best to protect musical works.97
In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (“DMCA”), which criminalized online or digital attempts to
circumvent measures to protect copyrighted material from
infringement.98 Section 512, a provision of the DMCA, governs
limitations on liability for Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”)
relating to infringement of online material on websites they host.99
Subsection (c) provides a safe harbor for ISPs, relieving them of
liability for infringing activity if the ISP did not have control over
the infringing content, expeditiously removed the infringing
material, and did not directly benefit financially from the
material.100 ISPs that fail to meet all three requirements of the safe
93

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984)
(“[A]s new developments have occurred in this country, it has been Congress that has
fashioned new rules that technology made necessary.”).
94
See Brian Sanchez, Legislative Update: The Section 115 Mechanical License and the
Copyright Modernization Act, 17 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 37, 42–43
(2006).
95
See Korn, supra note 73, at 490.
96
Copyrighted musical works were, and still are, made easily and readily available free
of charge on countless Internet sites. See Keyes, supra note 83, at 418 (“The Internet has
made procurement of all types of music incredibly easy, and monstrously cost effective,
which has lured users to this new medium in unparalleled droves.”).
97
See id. at 419–20 (“The basic and essentially exclusive philosophical inquiry posed
by music copyright legislators and judicial decision makers has been this: are music
copyright owners being adequately protected from others’ use of the musical material?”).
98
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
99
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
100
Id. § 512(c).
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harbor provision are held responsible for the dissemination of, or
access to, the infringing material hosted on their websites.101
In addition to digitalized technology concerns that are at the
forefront of the current debate surrounding how to regulate Internet
copyright, traditional means of infringement are still a prevalent
concern for musical copyright holders.102 The magnitude of
copyright infringement claims is not fully realized in popular
culture since most claims are settled prior to actual litigation.103
Cases that have actually proceeded to litigation highlight that
musical copyright infringement, whether through traditional or
digitized means, has been, and continues to be, a compelling
concern for the judiciary, yielding a variety of results.104 In
McDonald v. Multimedia Entertainment, Inc., the Southern District
of New York held that the use of one “rather unimportant” note by
the defendant could not support a finding of infringement in light
of the dissimilar nature of the rest of the two compositions.105 In
Cottrill v. Spears, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that
although defendant, Brittney Spears’ song entitled What U See is
What U Get, was obviously similar to the plaintiff’s song, What
You See is What You Get, this similarity in title, which was also
reflected in both songs’ lyrics, “[was] not probative of copying as
the phrase is a cliché and can be found in prior art.”106 The court
also found that the similarities in the two songs’ pitch, chords,
tempo, and repetition of a single note in each verse was insufficient
to warrant a finding of infringement.107
Not all copyright litigation has resulted in findings favoring the
defendant. The court in Baxter v. MCA, Inc. held that there could

101

Id.
See Keyes, supra note 83, at 418 (“From 1950 through 2000, there were forty-three
reported cases dealing with music copyright infringement . . . .”).
103
See id. (stating the fact that many more disputes centered on music copyright
infringement never ripened into litigation).
104
See Christian, supra note 33, at 134–40 (discussing musical copyright infringement
cases).
105
McDonald v. Multimedia Entm’t, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10649, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1991).
106
Cottrill v. Spears, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8823, at *33 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2003).
107
See id. (holding that these similarities are common aspects of popular music and
constitute insufficient similarity).
102
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possibly be a finding of infringement even when the similarity
between two works could be reduced to a short, six note
sequence.108 The case of Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham involved
two songs that were popular at different times. The alleged
infringement consisted of an eight note pattern that created the
same effect in both pieces.109 The court held that the defendant
was liable for infringement, even though the act was done
subconsciously by the defendant.110 Finally, in Jarvis v. A&M
Records, the court held that although common phrase and chord
progressions are usually non-copyrightable, the phrasing in the
original work was a copyrightable expression.111
The end of the twentieth and advent of the twenty-first
centuries have been marked by technological advancement and an
increasing presence of the Internet in everyday life. The changes
brought by the Internet create unprecedented issues of copyright
infringement that the courts are unsure what to do with,
particularly with regard to musical works.112 The court in
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films acknowledged and
addressed the reality that technological advances have created a
new set of infringement possibilities and copyright disputes.113
Currently, there are no absolute, clear cut answers or guidelines to
regulate infringing activity on the Internet.114

108

Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987).
Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
110
Id. at 148.
111
Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 292 (D.N.J. 1993).
112
Keyes, supra note 83, at 408–09 (“With the demise of Napster, the rise of peer-topeer networking, and the onslaught of litigation orchestrated by the RIAA, the topic of
music copyright has been thrust to the fore in business, scholarly and policy-making
circles. . . . Policy makers are grasping for the ever-evasive answers as to how the law
should be deployed and applied in the world of networked file-swapping, particularly in
the context of music copyrights.”).
113
See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647, 655 (6th Cir. 2004).
114
See generally Symposium, The Death or Rebirth of the Copyright, 18 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1095 (2008); see also Christian, supra note 33, at 142
(“The music industry is in grave need of a standard by which to judge the many uses of
fragmented copying.”).
109
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III. “I’D RATHER BE ANYTHING BUT ORDINARY PLEASE”:115
PUMPING ORIGINALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
INTO THE MUSICAL COPYRIGHT SCHEMA
A. Reworking the Originality Requirement
In the midst of a culture marked by copycat artists and
technological advancements that encourage infringing activity, one
may wonder what, if anything, can be done to bring original and
creative music back from the dead. One possibility is to rework
the existing originality requirement for musical copyright. By
raising the standard for originality, the access of the entire music
catalogue made possible by the Internet could be used to prevent
potential infringement disputes.
In the current copyright regime for musical works, there is no
definition of originality.116 A work sufficiently meets the criteria
for originality as long as it was independently created with a
modicum of creativity.117 The existing concept of originality is
concerned only with the creative process and not the product. This
is in direct opposition to the novelty standard required in patent
law.118 Novelty replaces originality in patent law.119 In order to
qualify for patent protection, a work must be novel, not just to the
author but to the public at large. To receive patent protection “you
must do something new.”120 While patent novelty goes a bit too
far for musical copyright, the current minimal standard of
originality does not require enough from the artist. A hybrid of
copyright originality and patent novelty would best serve the
interests of promoting the creation of new works without stifling
the creative process in music. The hybrid would be simultaneously
concerned with an independent creative process and would
examine the product resulting from the process in light of the
entire catalogue of already existing musical copyrights. To ensure
that the revised requirement does not go beyond what is necessary
115
116
117
118
119
120

AVRIL LAVIGNE, Anything But Ordinary, on LET GO (Arista Records 2002).
See supra text accompanying notes 41–47.
MERGES ET AL., supra note 44.
See id.
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 161 (1992).
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to provide the public with new and creative works, determining
qualification for copyright protection would place more emphasis
on the creative process than the resulting product.
Since musical works are made up of various technical
elements, there is more than ample room in musical works for a
higher standard of originality.121 The originality requirement for
musical copyright should be used to further the framers’ intention
of promoting creative works. Copyright laws should utilize
originality as a tool to increase creativity among musical artists to
ensure that they are in fact striving to produce something that is
somewhat new. Requiring more than a modicum of creativity is
the first step in forcing artists to realize the untapped potential for
originality in musical works. Perhaps if Avril Lavigne, Vanilla
Ice, Michael Bolton, and countless other artists had previously
been held to a higher standard of originality, copycat works and
costly lawsuits could have been avoided, and truly original musical
works could have come to fruition instead.
B. Using the Internet as a Shield Against Potential
Infringement Claims
Supporters of the current originality requirement in copyright
are concerned that raising the bar would place too great a burden
on artists and would, in effect, stifle the creative process.122 These
supporters are ignoring the possibility that a stronger originality
requirement that would encourage accountability in the product
does not have to affect the creative process.123 Under the revised
originality requirement, the creative process of an artist would
remain unchanged. No additional steps are required until the
creative process has ended and resulted in a musical piece.
Further, that creative process, if independent and original to the
artist, would be an important consideration in determining the
original value of the musical work. Once the creative process is
complete, and the musical work is in its final form, the artist would
121

See Smith, supra note 76, at 142.
See Keyes, supra note 83, at 425 (claiming that copyright holders are given too broad
a power over their works).
123
Contra Bartlett, supra note 66, at 320 (arguing that requiring an artist to stop and
obtain a license when wanting to sample is disruptive to the creative process).
122
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have to examine that final product against the existing catalogue of
copyrighted musical works.
Under the current test for copyright, an original artist must
show that the alleged infringer had access to the original work.124
The law as written encourages willful blindness. As long as an
artist doesn’t look, he may not be held responsible for what should
be infringement. The message being sent is: if it can’t be proven
that I have heard the original work, then I have not infringed. On
the other end of the spectrum, the law as written allows artists to be
punished for subconscious copyright infringement.125 In these
situations, artists who unknowingly infringe upon an original work
are held responsible for the infringement based solely on the
“striking similarities” between the two works. The unsuspecting
artist is dragged into a settlement or litigation and is forced to
compensate the original artist for his subconscious violation. In
both situations, either the willfully blind artist or the subconscious
infringing artist is forced to partake in some legal proceeding,
whether it is a settlement or litigation, to resolve the conflict.
The Internet has more or less defeated a defense to the access
argument. Whether or not an infringing artist has actually had
access is somewhat irrelevant in a society where anyone easily
could have access in a matter of seconds.126 The increased level of
access made possible by the Internet could be used to force artists
to be initially accountable for any possible infringement before
receiving a copyright for the “new” work. In order to receive a
copyright, an artist would have to search a database to see if the
work he is claiming as his own has already been published by
someone else. The database could be created by members of the
music industry who would maintain and update the database, as
well as deal with potential infringements that artists are made
aware of through it.

124

See supra text accompanying notes 58–65.
See Keyes, supra note 83, at 425 (arguing that the copyright laws are wrong to
punish subconscious infringement).
126
See id. at 418 (“[T]he Internet has made procurement of all types of music incredibly
easy and monstrously cost effective . . . .”); see also Keyt, supra note 62, at 429 (stating
that copying is proved by the defendant’s ability to access the plaintiff’s work and the
similarity between their works).
125

CASTANARO_050508_FINAL

1290

5/5/2008 12:32:36 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 18

This database would allow an artist to search through the
catalogue of copyrighted musical works by using segments of the
new work. The artist could simultaneously search all of the
technical elements, as well as the lyrics, working together to see if
his creation mirrors one that already exists. The artist would be
able to see if his chord sequence set to a certain tempo or rhythm,
against a specific melody or harmony, and set to certain lyrics is
already in the copyright catalogue. If there was a potential match,
the artist would not be declined a copyright for his “new” work.
He would, however, have to seek the appropriate permission from
the original artist, through the regulators of the database, before
being granted a copyright.
The process of seeking permission would involve some form of
compulsory licensing as well as a sliding scale of compensation for
the original author based on the amount and similarity of the
potential infringement.127
Upon learning of a potential
infringement, an artist seeking copyright would contact a copyright
regulatory board, associated with the database, and explain the
nature of the similarities, or submit samples of the similar sound
clips. The board would then decide the merits of the potential
infringement claim and calculate the appropriate compensation to
the original artist based on the amount, substantiality, similarity,
and originality of the infringed segment.128 If similarity was found
between the two works in a way that an ordinary listener would
determine the segments were similar but could still hear a slight
difference, appropriate compensation might simply be an
acknowledgment to the original artist in the new album.129 The
more similar two segments are, and the increasing length of similar
127

Other articles have suggested similar licensing schemes with regard to conflicts in
musical copyright. See Kravis, supra note 25, at 273–75 (suggesting a modified
compulsory licensing scheme to regulate the practice of music sampling); R. Anthony
Reese, Copyright and Internet Music Transmissions: Existing Law, Major Controversies,
Possible Solutions, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 265–66 (2001) (suggesting a new collective
licensing mechanism in which “[l]icenses could be tailored and priced depending on the
nature of the transmission”).
128
See generally Keyes, supra note 83, at 439 (encouraging a system that allows use of
pre-existing work by new artists based on a fee that considers the amount of music
borrowed and the number of phonorecords produced).
129
See generally Smith, supra note 76, at 138–39 (suggesting a sliding scale approach
to determine the extent of a work’s originality).
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segments would increase compensation from acknowledgment to a
monetary royalty that would be appropriate to reflect the original
artist’s interests.
New artists who conduct a good faith search under this scheme
would be granted a compulsory license to the “borrowed” segment
from the original work, as an incentive for new artists to comply
with the provision. In exchange for the determined appropriate
compensation, the original artist would be forced to allow the new
artist to “borrow” the segment from the original work under a
compulsory license. A compulsory license allows an artist to use
the copyrighted work of another artist without explicit permission
in exchange for a royalty payment.130 Compulsory licensing is
provided for in the Copyright Act with regard to musical works.131
An artist seeking use of an existing copyrighted work is entitled to
a compulsory license if he notifies the original author of his intent,
or if the original author cannot be found, by filing notice in the
Copyright Office.132 The compulsory licensee may not change the
basic, fundamental character of the work.133 The concept of
extending compulsory licensing in musical copyright has been a
recent topic of debate with regard to digital sampling.134 Those in
favor of extending compulsory licensing find that its ability to
guarantee access to the existing catalogue of copyrighted works
will ensure that original artists are appropriately compensated for
use of their works.135 Other scholars argue that extending
compulsory licensing would be unfair to original authors, because
compulsory licensing forces the original artist to allow the new
artist to use the work. They also argue that extending compulsory
licensing would compromise the integrity of the original musical
work, because the original artist is powerless to object to changes
and manipulations of the original work by the new artist, so long as

130

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 938 (8th ed. 2004).
See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000).
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Digital sampling is the process by which an artist copies part of another artist’s work
and incorporates the original work verbatim into the new work. See BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1368 (8th ed. 2004).
135
Kravis, supra note 25, at 274–75.
131
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the new artist does not fundamentally change the character of the
work.136
An extension of compulsory licensing in the proposed scheme
for encouraging originality would serve to protect authors whose
works are incidentally similar to those of new artists and would
preempt unnecessary legal proceedings that result in the case of
dubiously similar songs. For example, take the case of Avril
Lavigne’s current copyright controversy. Under the proposed
system, Avril would have been made aware of the similar sounding
Rubinoos’ song prior to releasing Girlfriend. She then could have
contacted the regulatory board to determine her next step.
Depending on the board’s analysis, the Rubinoos would have been
properly notified and compensated. The pending litigation and
possible settlement would not have started, saving Avril, and the
Rubinoos, lawyer fees, court costs, and time.
This process would preempt the potential litigation or
settlement proceedings that willfully blind or subconscious
infringers face. An artist would have already conducted a good
faith search for potential infringement. In many cases, this would
circumvent the need for potential litigation by dealing with the
problem before it becomes a problem. In the long run, artists
would be saving money spent on lawyer’s fees, expert witness
testimony that is necessary in every copyright infringement case,
and potential jury awards that would exceed the royalties allotted
for on the sliding scale.137 The artist would also avoid the
embarrassment of any bad press that comes with allegations of
infringement in the aftermath of releasing a popular work. The
court would also benefit as this system would “help stem the
swelling tide of music copyright infringement cases.”138 Most
artists would prefer to conduct a search and face the possibility of

136

Lucille M. Ponte, The Emperor Has No Clothes: How Digital Sampling Infringement
Cases Are Exposing Weaknesses in Traditional Copyright Law and the Need for
Statutory Reform, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 515, 551 (2006).
137
See Christian, supra note 33, at 135.
138
Keyes, supra note 83, at 439–40 (discussing the positive ramifications of this
proposed compulsory license scheme on overcrowded court dockets and the increasing
number of copyright infringement cases).
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potentially paying the appropriate compulsory fee rather than
“facing a potential lengthy and costly court battle.” 139
C. Old and New Protection for Musical Artists
The traditional safeguards present in existing musical copyright
law ensure that musical works would not be disadvantaged by a
heightened standard of originality or the proposed process
advocating accountability. Section 115 entitles any artist to a
compulsory license in an endeavor to remake or “cover” an
original work.140 A compulsory license is in use as soon as the
new artist distributes copies in a fixed tangible form to the public
under the authority of the original artist.141 In order to be entitled
to a compulsory license, notice must be given to the copyright
holder of the licensee’s intent.142
Without this notice, a
compulsory license will not be granted and the would-be licensee
is liable for infringement.143 The proposal in the previous section
incorporates notice into the process through the suggested
copyright regulatory board.
An important aspect of the compulsory license is that it allows
the licensee to create his own sound recording of the original work,
but it does not permit the licensee to copy the original recording.144
This aspect of compulsory licensing is important to the purpose of
the copyright schema previously proposed. It signifies that the
licensee must put his own labor into creating the recording that
triggers use of the license.145 The licensee cannot merely lift or
copy the original recording. The compulsory license provision
gives new artists an overwhelming opportunity to use the existing
catalogue. It also serves as a control on the exclusive rights and
monopoly of a copyright holder.146

139

Id.
See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000).
141
See Sanchez, supra note 94, at 39–42 (explaining compulsory licensing).
142
See 17 U.S.C. § 115.
143
See Sanchez, supra note 94, at 39–42 (explaining compulsory licensing).
144
See id.
145
See 17 U.S.C. § 115.
146
See Palladium Music, Inc. v. Eatsleepmusic, Inc., 398 F.3d 1193, 1198–1200 (10th
Cir. 2005).
140
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The proposed scheme does not defeat the traditional copyright
defenses of fair use and de minimis use. Section 107 carves an
exception in the exclusive rights of a copyright holder for “fair
use” by others.147 In determining whether or not a new work
constitutes a fair use of an original work, the factors considered
are: (1) the purpose and nature of the new work; (2) the nature of
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount of the original work used and
the substantiality of the used portion to the original work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the new work on the original’s
potential in the marketplace.148 The proposed standard for musical
copyright in no way affects, changes, or limits the fair use defense.
The de minimis doctrine provides that if the alleged infringement
is essentially trivial, the court will not recognize it.149 The sliding
scale in the proposed process does not swallow the de minimis
defense; instead, it incorporates it. After a potential infringement
is brought to the copyright regulatory board, the board would
analyze the situation to determine if an infringement worthy of
recognition or compensation exists. It logically follows that if an
artist reports a potential infringement that fits the de minimis
standard, the board would conclude that the potential infringement
is not worthy of recognition.
In addition to the existing protection afforded to new artists and
copyright holders, the proposed originality and accountability
standards offer new protection. In order to prevail on a claim of
copyright infringement, the new procedure looks for originality in
the work as a whole. It examines all of the components of a
musical piece working together to determine whether or not it is
similar enough to an already copyrighted work to constitute
infringement. This concept realizes that originality lies within the
work as a whole and not in a single, removed technical element.150
Consequently, copyright infringement would be based and only

147

See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
See id.; see generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1993).
149
See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A] taking is
considered de minimis only if it is so meager and fragmentary that the average audience
would not recognize the appropriation.”).
150
See Keyt, supra note 62, at 433 (“[O]riginality is more likely to be found in the
interaction and conjunction of elements than in the elements themselves . . . .”).
148
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exist in similarities resulting from all of the elements of a piece
working together as a single expression.
CONCLUSION:
The question remains: will life be pumped back into the
originality requirement for musical copyright or will the practices
of copycats reign supreme? Since musical works are composed of
a combination of elements working together, artists should be
pushed to reach a little bit higher than authors of other copyrighted
material in terms of creating original works. Originality in the
creation of musical works does not have to be a dead or defeated
concept. There is plenty of room for original thought and
creativity in the musical world; however, the potential for it may
never be realized if artists are not forced to think outside of the
already constructed box.
The proposed resolution, discussed in the previous section,
adds a concern for the product resulting from the creative process
where the current concept for musical copyright is only concerned
with the process itself. It heightens the requirement for a musical
work to qualify as an “original work of authorship.” To continue
balancing the competing interests of protecting the work of a
copyright holder and not stifling the creative process, the second
part of the resolution proposes using the availability of the musical
catalogue on the Internet as a means of promoting accountability
among artists after the completion of the creative process, but prior
to distributing their work to the public. The sliding scale approach
would allow the original artist to be acknowledged or compensated
appropriately and would preempt potential litigation or
infringement claims in the aftermath of the new artist promoting
their new work.
Today’s alleged infringers are tomorrow’s artists who will be
fighting for their rights as copyright holders to original works. It’s
a well known fact in the music world that musicians get their
inspiration and motivation from listening to other musicians.151
151
See Christian, supra note 33, at 142 (stating the belief that musicians are inspired by
other musicians).
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Doesn’t the inspiring musician deserve credit or acknowledgment
if his original work is the base of what another artist creates?
Contemporary artists, who will eventually become inspiring
musicians, would benefit from the protection their works would
receive in the future under the proposed copyright scheme.
Reworking the copyright regime for musical works could be the
first step in a new direction that considers using the Internet to
ameliorate, instead of only contribute to, copyright infringement.
If the laws remain unchanged, we’re going to be stuck with the
same old song—and maybe it’s time for something new.

